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Arising from a flurry of Supreme Court activism since 
1987,' the shape and direction of a new Takings Clause 
jurisprudence are now emerging. Of the seven principal 
clusters of takings doctrine: perhaps the most vitally affected 
area of contention between the state and the individual 
property owner is the area of predatory municipal zoning 
 practice^.^ This is the area of ultimate municipal 
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. 
City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531-34 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 US. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
2. For a discussion of the seven principal clusters of takings doctrine, see 
infr& part II.B.l-7. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for a 
reconfiguration of these clusters of doctrine in accord with the lengthy dicta in 
Lucas. See also infra Configuration A. 
3. The conduct of municipal government, and other agencies of the state, can 
frequently result in the destruction of private property values as part of a 
deliberate plan to acquire property rights for a public purpose. A variety of 
governmental tools is frequently used in an attempt to "rig" the market in favor of 
government's enrichment of the public accounts at the expense of private property 
owners. See San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 274 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1975); see also Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1197-1200 
(8th Cir. 1983) (city a ~ e x e d  land already zoned for industrial park purposes-and 
scheduled for private development-and then proceeded to change the property's 
preferred use designation at least four times in a four-year period); Archer 
Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Ctr. Dev. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(holding that a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 claim survives a motion to dismiss when both the 
PWDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING 
gamesmanship. A governmental unit may employ value- 
suppressing or value-diminishing regulatory actions in order to 
obtain an outright transfer of the fee title to land, or lesser 
property rights, from the private sector at little or no public 
costO4 Because of severe municipal budgetary restraints, 
coupled with heightened demands for increased public services 
and public capital amenities, the temptation to engage in 
value-destroying gamesmanship confronts municipal offices 
around the country5 This municipal gamesmanship is 
city and the city's designated redeveloper act in concert to inhibit the private land 
owner's ability to lease, sell, or use its land, thereby creating a cash flow shortage 
leading to tax delinquencies and ultimately resulting in title forfeiture to the 
government at amounts far below the agreed-upon renewal acquisition price of 
$775,000). 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), af'd on other grounds, ,447 
U.S. 255 (1980), is one of the most significant takings cases of the past fifteen 
years. In Agins, entrenched large parcel owners combined with the city to block 
rezoning for middle- and lower-income residences, thereby depressing residential 
land values. See id. at 32-35 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Agins court held that a 
private landowner's remedy for a temporary regulatory taking does not lie in 
inverse condemnation but, rather, in uncompensated mandamus or declaratory 
relief. Id. at  32. However, that portion of Agins was explicitly overruled by the 
Supreme Court in First English, 482 U.S. at 310-11. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
Apart from the predatory zoning cases, some municipal agencies have prevailed 
on'the issue of whether inequitable pre-condemnation activities were unreasonable 
or intended to freeze or lower private property values and thus effect a taking. 
See, e.g., Cambria Spring Co. v. City of Pico Rivera, 217 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App. 
1985); Redevelopment Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc., 185 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. 
App. 1982); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980). 
4. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1101 (1984). One of the crucial tactics frequently used by municipal 
agencies in depressing private property values preparatory to a condemnation 
involves communications with tenants of the owner of the private buildings, 
discouraging them from continuing tenancies and thus depressing the value of the 
property. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), af'd, 405 
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); see Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Dev. Agency, 
561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977). 
I t  has been argued that governmental rent-seeking behavior should be 
discouraged not because it affects private property owners, but because it adversely 
affects sound municipal planning, encourages administrative arbitrariness, and 
increases the possibility of legal campaign donations and illegal bribes. Stewart E. 
Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1744-45 
(1988). 
5. See supra note 3. For example, in Seawall Assos. v. City of New York, 
542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989), New York City was (and 
still is) under enormous political pressure to resolve the problem of housing the 
homeless. There is very little doubt that the ordinance in that case, which required 
owners of single-room occupancy rental properties to restore and lease such units 
a t  controlled rents and which prohibited demolition or vacancy thereof, was 
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sometimes referred to by economists as government's "rent- 
seeking" behavior: and it is a symptom of a centuries-old 
statist syndrome.' 
Like many other parts of the Bill of Rights, the Takings 
Clause reflects the pre-Revolutionary experiences endured by 
the American colonists during the rule of England's imperial 
g~vernment.~ The Takings Clause has classically been 
construed to permit government to  appropriate private property 
for a nearly limitless range of public purposes: but such 
designed as a method of providing 52,000 housing units for the city's homeless 
without incurring public costs. Although the New York court conceded that "no one 
disputes the City's power-indeed its duty-to fashion meaningful solutions to 
address homelessness," id. at 1071, the commands of the 1987 takings trilogy 
required that the instant property owners not be forced "alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." Id. at 1065 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); 
see John P. Trevaskis, Measure of Damages for Regulatory Takings, PRoB. & PROP., 
Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 17, 17-18. 
6. Sterk, supra note 4, at 1744-45. 
7. It was no mere coincidence that Machiavelli warned the'Medici princes in 
Renaissance Italy of the danger to governmental power when taking of property 
becomes flagrant: "[Blut above all, a Prince must abstain from taking the property 
of others for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of 
patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property are never wanting." NICOL~ 
MACHIAVEUI, THE PRINCE 90 (Gouss trans., 1952). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Property must become too precarious for Dhe 
Genius of a free People which can be taken from them at  the Will of others, who 
c a ~ o t  know what Taxes such people can bear . . . ." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 
U.S. 33, 68-69 (1990) ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., concurring in judgment) (quoting the Virginia 
Petitions to King and Parliament, December 18, 1764, reprinted in THE STAMP ACT 
CRISIS 41 (Edmund S. Morgan ed. 1952)); see Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings 
and Civil Authority in Eighteenthcentury America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1970). 
English legal policy regarding domestic property rights embraced a strong 
tradition of compensation for all property taken by the Crown. WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 74 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1941) ("[Tlhe legislature 
alone can interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. It does this not by 
arbitrarily depriving the party of his property, ' but by giving him a full 
i nded ica t ion  and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained."). J.P.W.B. 
McAuslan, Compensation and Betterment, in CITIES, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 77, 
86 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1984) ("[A] local planning authority may be required to 
purchase land rendered incapable of reasonably beneficial use by virtue of the 
refusal of planning permission . . . ."). 
9. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). As Justice Douglas wrote for 
the Court in Berman: 
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and 
order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely 
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it . . . . 
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or 
is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and 
inclusive . . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, 
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takings must be accompanied by payment of just compensation 
to the private owner.'' During the past few years, a half- 
dozen important Supreme Court cases (and numerous state 
court decisions) have sharply reconfigured Takings Clause 
jurisprudence. These cases bear generally on all seven 
classifi~ations~~ of takings law and, for the purposes of this 
Article, bear importantly upon the core questions involved with 
predatory governmental land regulation.12 
Part I1 of this Article briefly delineates the emerging 
Takings Clause recodiguration and defines the predatory 
regulation class of cases. Part I11 demonstrates that the 
concept of "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations" 
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In 
the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made 
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not 
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia 
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautifid as well as sanitary, 
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 
Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted); see Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
233-34 (1984). A good historical perspective on the evolution of direct eminent 
domain is found in Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in 
Early American Economic Development, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1263. Professor Tribe 
quite correctly identifies the doctrine of just compensation as being fundamentally 
conservative in that the ends (some desired public benefit) can be prevented by 
undercutting the means (requiring payment, not expropriation). LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, C O N S T ~ I O N A L  CHOICES 166-67 (1985). 
10. Nothing in Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Berman sanctioned 
uncompensated takings as a means to achieve government's end. 348 U.S. at 33 
("Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it 
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain 
is merely the means to the end.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
11. See supra parts II.B.l-7. 
12. The warnings of Madison and others are directly on point with predatory 
municipal gamesmanship in the destruction of property values. 
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices [as the Takings 
Clause] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to  be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
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("R.I.B.E.") has now become central to predatory regulatory 
takings. Part IV offers the principal alternative legal 
formulations for "timing" and "value" which are now at the 
heart of all R.I.B.E. determinations; and suggests some useful 
extensions and modifications to the Supreme Court's "timing" 
doctrine. 
A. Original Policy Premises 
James Madison and his contemporaries, in framing the Bill 
of Rights, embraced several Lockean notions. Respecting the 
pr~tections afforded t o  private property, the Framers' funda- 
mental policy premises concerned the following: a person's 
inherent right to private property ownership as being prior and 
morally superior to the state's;13 the source of private property 
as being the product of individual labor and ingenuity;14 and 
private property as a fundamental expression of one's freedom 
and its protection as one of the principal reasons for individu- 
als to enter into civilization and create governments.15 These 
13. The Supream [sic] Power c a ~ o t  take away from any Man any part of 
his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Proper- 
ty being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into 
Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should 
have Property, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by 
entring [sic] into society, which was the end for which they entered 
into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 5 138 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). 
14. Id. 55 137-139. 
15. Id. 5 138; see THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing whether slaves ought to be considered "citizens" or 
property). In discussing the facts that exist within a society, Madison also stated: 
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property 
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. 
The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From 
the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the 
possession of different degrees and kinds of property .immediately re- 
sults . . . . 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). A 
modern extension of Lockean-Madisonian views is the "new property." In his land- 
mark analysis of 1964, Professor Charles Reich stated: 
[Plroperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and 
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to 
yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and "antisocial" activities 
are given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of 
his neighbors decry. The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while 
the Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of con- 
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policy values informed the Madisonian constitutional formu- 
lae,16 that sought at  nearly every turn to curb the potential 
for government using its police powers to  abuse the personal 
and property rights of citizens, of an exploitative predilection 
that Madison's revolutionary colleague Thomas Jefferson con- 
demned as the "tendency of all human governments."'' Thus, 
the Fifth Amendment was enacted in recognition that 
government's inevitable appetites provide a continual danger to 
private ownership against which the Constitution must provide 
bulwarks. l8 The chief bulwark-and in modem jurisprudence 
very nearly the only bulwark-is the right of the citizen whose 
property rights are taken to demand payment of just compensa- 
tion from government. lg 
B. Modern Takings Clause Principles 
The judicial content given to the Takings Clause in modem 
times begins with certain Holmesean notions about the legiti- 
mate reach of government's police powers to enact regulations 
affecting property without continually paying just compensa- 
tion (what Holmes referred to as "the petty larceny of the police 
power").20 This is coupled with the notion that government 
flict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs 
of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the 
existence of private property. Political rights presuppose that individuals 
and private groups have the will and the means to a d  independently. 
But so long as individuals are motivated largely by self-interest, their 
well-being must first be independent. Civil liberties must have a basis in 
property, or bills of rights will not preserve them. 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (emphasis add- 
ed). 
16. U.S. C o ~ s r .  amend. V. 
17. In a letter from Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval in 1816, the former presi- 
dent wrote: 
[Tlhat private fortunes are destroyed by public as well as by private 
extravagance. And this is the tendency of all human governments. A 
departure from principle in one instance becomes a precedent for a sec- 
ond; that second for a third; and so on, till the bulk of the society is 
reduced to be mere automatons of misery, and to have no sensibilities left 
but for sinning and suffering. 
Reprinted in John G. West, Jr., Monticello's New Democrat, POLV REV., Spring 
1993, a t  58. 
18. See supra note 12. 
19. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
20. 1 HOLMES-LASKI L ~ E R S  457 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953) (''In this one 
[case] my brethren, as usual and as I expected, corrected my taste when I spoke of 
relying upon the petty larceny of the police power, dele [sic] 'the petty larceny of.' 
834 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
must not "go too far" in r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Some individu- 
als--certain property owners-must not be singled out to bear 
a disproportionate burden of the cost of public benefits which 
should be more justly borne by society as a whole through 
payment of just c~mpensa t ion .~~ 
A further basic Holmesean precept is that the magnitude 
of the public need, the public's urgency to achieve a benefit, is 
not material. Regulation cannot be used as a shortcut to paying 
for public benefits merely because the public need for such 
benefits is great.23 
Apart from these rather Olympian generalities, until re- 
cent years the judicial development of the Takings Clause has 
been What have eventually evolved are seven classi- 
fications or clusters of doctrine, only loosely related to one 
another. In order to understand the sudden emergence of 
R.I.B.E., timing, and valuation problems as the pivotal ques- 
tions for legal analysis in the area of predatory municipal prac- 
tices, it is necessary to take a brief detour through the seven 
principal clusters of takings doctrine as  they have evolved to 
date. 
1. The per se rule 
When government uses its coercive force to physically en- 
ter or occupy any portion of the property of a private owner, 
It is done-our effort is to please."). 
21. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 416 (1922). 
22. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
23. Mahon, 260 U.S. at  416. 
24. As Justice Cadena of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals put it: 
Despite the fact that the crazyquilt pattern of judicial doctrine in this 
area has not yet yielded a principle upon which the cases can be ratio- 
nalized, it is now universally recognized that acts short of actual physical 
invasion, appropriation or occupation can amount to a compensable tak- 
ing, and that governmental restrictions on the use of property can be so 
burdensome as to constitute a compensable taking. 
San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975). See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: FWVATE PROPERTY AND THE POW- 
ER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: 
A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Frank 
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); Joseph L. Sax, Property 
Rights in the US. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 
139 (1988); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modent Plot for an  Old 
Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989). For additional related au- 
thorities, see Appendix B. See infra Configuration A for diagram depicting the Tak- 
ings Clause reconfiguration. 
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the per se takings rule requires payment of just compensa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  This is true regardless of the trivial economic loss suf- 
fered by the private owner (or the trivial amount of compensa- 
tion to be paid by the state for such a taking) or the magnitude 
of the state's interest.26 At least since 1987 it has also been 
clear that both permanent and temporary physical occupations 
by the state may constitute per se  taking^.^' The per se con- 
struct is based upon the late Justice Thurgood Marshall's opin- 
ion in Loretto,z8 which has been unfairly derided with consid- 
erable sarcasm by some critics as an example of "fetishism" or 
"nineteenth century" jurisprudence of a "retrograde" nature.2g 
Such criticism misses the mark. Loretto derives its consid- 
erable force from the original policy premises of Madison and 
other Founders. Justice Marshall's analysis is wholly consistent 
with other portions of the Bill of Rights which, directly and 
through subsequent judicial interpretation, have vigorously 
restrained government &om using its coercive force to  enter the 
private property of citizens, whether government's purposes be 
to  procure criminal evidence, to  quarter troops, or to  establish a 
public benefit by the use of such property.30 
2. The harm-prevention rule 
For 106 years there has existed in Takings Clause juris- 
25. ' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
26. Id. a t  434-35. 
27. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987). After remand by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the South Carolina court determined that 
a variety of damages would be due and payable by reason of periods of temporary 
taking due to the regulations struck down by the Supreme Court in Lucas. Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
28. 458 U.S. at 419. 
29. "Skewed," "retrograde," and "nineteenth century" were the equally colorful 
denigrations used by Professor Costonis. Costonis, supra note 24, at  471. Professor 
Tribe has characterized Loretto as bordering on "fetishism" and as being an "oddi- 
ty" and a "lame excuse" for abandoning a workable rule of law. He has also 
scorned Loretta for the trivial nature of the amount of property invaded or occu- 
pied (1.5 cubic feet) and has advocated an undefined "workable balancing test" 
instead of the per se rule of physical invasion. TRIBE, supm note 9, at  177-78. 
Often, property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are treated casually 
by those who would never suggest a cavalier attitude towards other Fifth Amend- 
ment protections. This attitude should be contrasted to Professor Reich's view of 
property rights. Reich, supra note 15. 
30. U.S. CONST. amends. IV & V, see infra part 1V.G. For a discussion of the 
underlying Lockean notion that individual rights and liberties are closely tied to 
the right of private property ownership, see supra notes 13-15. 
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prudence a principle that  government may aggressively regu- 
late land uses to prevent loss of life or property which are 
threatened by the activities on private land by private own- 
e r ~ . ~ '  This rule parallels the public nuisance notions at com- 
mon law.32 Pursuant to this line of precedent, government is 
exempt from paying compensation even though it decrees that 
illegal breweries must be closed,33 infected cedar trees must 
be destroyed,34 urban brickyard plant operations are 
banned,s5 gravel and sand mining industries are restrictedP6 
underground coal mining activities are limited:' and the use 
of a flood-prone campsite is drastically curtailed.38 Until 1992, 
it was widely supposed that this cluster of cases represented 
the state's most powerful trump card to significantly regulate 
the use of private property without being deemed to have gone 
"too far" and without having to pay just compensa t i~n .~~ Jus- 
tice Scalia's opinion in Lucas includes several charged passages 
of dicta which may or may not result in the future limitation, 
or even rejection, of this cluster of cases.40 
Subsequent to Lucas, this group of cases probably still 
continues to have viability at least with respect to the owner's 
illegal activities on private property and to firebreaks and other 
emergency  hazard^.^' In both instances, and perhaps in oth- 
ers, the government apparently still retains the constitutional 
31. See infra notes 33-38; see also Bruce W .  Burton, Regulatory Takings and 
the Shape of Things to Come: Harbingers of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 
OR. L. REV. (forthcoming November 1993). 
32. Professor Michelman has opined that regulatory takings have been sorted 
into two sub-classes: takings which involve regulations preventing noxious or nui- 
sance-like uses and regulations securing affirmative public benefits. Michelman, 
supra note 24, at 1603. Although it is both useful and correct to divide the public 
purposes identified by the Court along harm-prevention and benefit-promotion de- 
marcations, this focuses on the governmental ends, not means, and is therefore not 
particularly helpful to an analysis of government's predatory practices. 
33. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). 
34. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928). 
35. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1915). 
36. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962). 
37. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedidis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 
(1987). 
38. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 
Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). 
39. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 325-26 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40. See Burton, supra note 31. 
41. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 n.14, 2900 
n.16 (1992). 
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authority to act decisively upon private property rights without 
paying c~mpensat ion.~~ 
3. Comprehensive Euclidian zoning 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, modem growth 
patterns in urban America have given rise to a considerable 
body of law favoring government with regard to comprehensive 
municipal zoning ordinances affecting land uses.43 For most of 
this century, the Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled 
that where procedural due process has not been violated and 
the land use regulations are not arbitrary or i r ra t i~nal ;~ com- 
prehensive city zoning is a valid exercise of police power and 
not one which requires compensation to the private landown- 
e d 5  The general reciprocity of advantage inherent in  classic 
Euclidian zoning has been cited as the primary policy ground 
for not requiring cornpen~ation,4~ unless predatory or other 
abusive elements are pre~ent .~ '  
4. Aesthetics /historic preservation /evolving cultural 
sensibilities 
Statism's weakest reed (and the smallest bundle of case 
law) flows from the baMing and controversial decision of the 
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York? New York City, for reasons of public aesthetics 
and historic preservation, was permitted to regulate land use 
in such a way as to deprive the property owner of all use of the 
- -- 
42. Id. For an entertaining polernic whgre "hyper-Lockeann privatists and 
other largely unnamed advocates of a foolish "dyadic scheman are contrasted to 
enlightened triadic Kantian statists in the Takings Clause struggle between claims 
of the private owner and majoritarian appetites, see Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory 
Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?, 17 VT. L. REV. 647 (1993). 
43. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365, 395-96 (1926); 
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 
277 US. 183, 188-89 (1928); City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981). 
44. See supra note 43. 
45. 6A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPOR~TIONS 8 25.06 (3d ed. 1988). 
Although injunctive relief (i.e., no damages) was the thrust of most zoning cases 
until the 1987 trilogy, this approach did not go unchallenged. DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW $8 2.17-2.18 (2d ed. 1988). For a cogent account of 
this "Nectow fallacy," see Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Eco- 
nomic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 490-92 (1977). 
46. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 45, 88 24.06-24.07. 
47. Burton, supm note 31. 
48. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
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valuable air space above Grand Central S t a t i~n .~ '  The specific 
basis of the Penn Central opinion is unfathomable (there may 
be six or seven viable candidates for the exact holding).50 Few 
cases follow Penn Central, suggesting that this doctrinal classi- 
fication has suffered a significant dilution from whatever force 
it originally p o s s e ~ s e d . ~ ~  In any event, Penn Central's mini- 
malist holding would likely be that where government regula- 
tions do not deprive the owner of all opportunity to use her 
property rights consistent with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations ("R.I.B.E.") and where mitigating factors are also 
present, regulations premised on historic and aesthetic preser- 
vation do not require government to pay just  omp pens at ion.^^ 
5. Exactions /nexus principles 
The law of municipal exactions as a facet of takings juris- 
prudence has evolved rapidly since World War 11." Tradition- 
49. Id. at 129. 
50. There is strong legal argument for the proposition that Penn Central 
could stand for any of the following: 
(1) There is a general reciprocity of benefits to the affected property owners 
and .to all of society by historic landmark preservation regulations that makes the 
losses suffered by specific owners not subject to payment of just compensation 
(where, as here, the city denied a building permit for a new, aesthetically disrup- 
tive 50-story tower in the air space above Grand Central Station). 
(2) The decision as to whether just compensation is necessary must be suffi- 
ciently ripe and all possible local remedies exhausted. 
(3) The harm-prevention notion of the second cluster of takings decisions (see 
supra part II.B.2) may be broad enough to apply to any and all municipal regula- 
tions, including aesthetic or historic preservation regulations, regardless of their 
impact on private ownership rights. 
(4) Great procedural deference must be given to an appellate court's ruling that 
the private owners in Penn Central had not met their burden of proof as to the 
loss of property value. 
(5) No compensation need be paid unless the owner's reasonable investment- 
backed expectations have been sacrificed to the government's regulations. 
(6) Certain tax advantages and transferable development rights which the gov- 
ernment allocated to the affected property owners were the financial equivalent of 
compensation and therefore the regulation, even if it effectuated a taking of some 
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, had also indirectly paid in lieu 
of just-compensation benefits. 
Id. at  118-19, 134-35; see id. at  120-21, 127, 137; infra notes 81-85 and accompany- 
ing text; see also Wilkins, supra note 24. 
51. Landmark Land Co. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Colo. 1986), 
appeal dismissed sub nom. Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 483 U.S. 1001 
(1987); see Wilkins, supra note 24, at 22-24. 
52. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. 
53. Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Dedications, and Impact Fees, in ALI-ABA, 
LAND USE INSTP~PI'E: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND 
PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING 
ally, this body of law dealt with the regulatory power of the 
government to exact a quid pro quo from a developer-landown- 
er in exchange for certain approvals or permits.54 Classically, 
the government has the power, without payment of just com- 
pensation, to require that the developer dedicate utility ease- 
ments, street easements, and similar property rights to the 
public in return for receiving authority to subdivide and plat 
the land.55 This concept progressively evolved to embrace the 
notion that exactions could also include dedication of land for 
parks and schools to service the additional population expected 
to arise because of the developer's subdivision and home-build- 
ing a c t i ~ i t i e s . ~ ~  Alternatively, the developer may be required 
to pay to the city cash sums in lieu of dedication, to be used for 
schools and parks in other areas of the city rather than requir- 
ing the dedication of land on site.57 This further evolved into 
the principle of "linkage" whereby a developer was required to 
contribute additional development deemed necessary in other 
parts of the city in exchange for being permitted to develop the 
land involved in the permit application. For example, a devel- 
oper might be required to build low-cost housing in another 
part of the city to balance out the entire municipal demograph- 
ics goal in  return for which the developer would be granted a 
building permit for office or retail buildings on the site in ques- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The case of Nollan u. California Coastal Cornrnis~ion~~ 
introduced several more rigorous legal standards, some of 
which go well beyond exactions law. The Nollan Court rejected 
the twin premises that all human property use activities exist- 
ed at the pleasure of government,BO and therefore any exac- 
tions attached by government to permits and licenses were 
COMPENSATION 887 (1992). 
54. Id. 
55. MANDELKER, supra note 45, § 9.16. 
56. Id. $ 9.18. 
57. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CON- 
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 544, 571-72 (3d ed. 1990); John M. Groen, Developer 
Fees and Emctions, in ALI-ABA, INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERN- 
MENT LLABILITY (1992). See Taub, supra note 53, at 887-88, 909-12 for a general 
overview of exactions evolution from on-site land dedication to "linkage fees." 
58. See Jerome G. Rose, Development Fees: To What Extent May Municipali- 
ties Shift the Costs of Public Improvements to New Developments, N.J. MUNICIPALI- 
TIES, Feb. 1988, at 12. 
59. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). . 
60. Id. at 833 n.2. 
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d i d o 6 '  This was established at least insofar as classic fee 
simple land ownership rights were concerned.62 
Nollan introduced the concept that there must be an ap- 
propriate connection ("nexus") between the demanded exaction 
and the evil which government wishes to  defeat, which evil 
must be generated by the landowner's proposed activity.63 
Nollan, consistent with the original political values of the Tak- 
ings Clause, determined that there was considerable risk of 
government's "rent-seeking" behavior when exactions were 
being demanded of a landowner in return for a permit which 
merely allowed the landowner to engage in those activities 
historically found within the concept of the fee simple, such as 
constructing b~i ldings .~ The Nollan Court signaled that, 'at 
least in the area of exactions, a heightened judicial scrutiny 
would examine the conduct of govern~nent.~~ 
Finally, Nollan made it clear that mere news-asserting 
verbiage would be insufficient and that the Court would scruti- 
nize very carefully the legislative allegations concerning the 
nexus between the landowner's proposed activities and the 
required exaction, thereby indicating a modification of the 
customary view that all legislative conduct in such matters is 
presumed constitutional." Subsequent cases have extended 
the logic of the news test into areas not related to exactions 
law,67 and the growing scope of Nollan has been widely ob- 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 831. 
63. Id. at 837. 
64. Id. at 841-42. 
65. In both Nollan and Lucas, the Court made it clear that heightened judi- 
cial scrutiny will be applied when property rights are being significantly dimin- 
ished by regulation or exaction. Evidence of the Court's skepticism about 
government's motives is clear. Whether formally or informally, government appears 
to be saddled with a larger burden of proof insofar as regulatory takings are con- 
cerned. The government bears at  least a burden of persuasion with respect to 
questions of preexisting law, linkage between the purpose of the regulation and 
the evils being regulated, and similar questions. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895; Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 841; cf. United States v. Carolene : 
(1938). 
66. 483 U.S. at 838, 841; see Hadacheck 
(1915). 
67. Seawall Assos. v. City of New York, 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989). 
68. Id. 
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 
542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068-69 (N.Y.), 
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6. Categorical formulation 
In 1992, Justice Scalia revisited the Takings Clause, writ- 
ing for a split Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun- 
ciLBg As noted earlier, Lucas appears riddled with dicta, but it 
may represent the most formidable Takings Clause opinion in 
recent times.70 Lucas appears to vastly undermine the harm- 
prevention cluster of cases,71 and hints at additional post- 
Nollan changes in the presumption of validity granted t o  
government's land control legislation." In addition, Lucas 
suggests a variety of significant considerations regarding 
R.I.B.E.,73 and establishes a new area of seemingly absolute 
protection of private property.74 Whenever all valuable use 
has been prohibited by a government regulation, the "categori- 
cal formulation" requires that just compensation shall be 
paid.75 This appears to  be as much a blanket rule as that 
found in the physical occupancy cases of Cluster One above. 
Unraveling the dicta of Lucas and predicting its future use will 
have material implications for all of the other takings clus- 
ters .76 
7. Predatory municipal zoning practices 
As noted, government's aggressive use of its regulatory 
power to  depress or destroy private values in the interest of 
furthering governmental plans for an area has often been re- 
garded as a Takings Clause violation which resurrects some of 
the worst Madisonian fears of governmental powers over the 
rights of private citizens.77 When the municipal council in a 
Michigan city freezes the ability of landowners to find tenants 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
See Burton, supra note 31. 
See supra part II.B.2. 
112 S. Ct. at 2894, 2898 n.12. 
See id. at 2900-01. 
Id. at 2902 n.18. 
Id. at 2901. 
See id. at 2903-04. For example, the implications go not merely to  the 
presumption of correctness of legislative determinations and the resulting burden of 
proof, but also to such substantial matters as what laws would apply to the deter- 
mination of R.I.B.E., at what moment in time the R.I.B.E. and the status of such 1 
laws would be fixed for purposes of valuation, and what, if any, absolute defenses 
exist on behalf of government to resist the implication that value has been taken. 
See id. at  2893, 2894 n.6, 2900 n.16, 2902 n.18. 
77. See supra notes I%?. 
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or purchasers and drives down the value of lands tentatively 
scheduled for future redevelopment, it is seen as  a violation of 
the protection of private property under the Takings Clause." 
Similarly, a regulatory taking may result when two or more 
governmental units in Texas, for instance, collaborate to drive 
out tenants renting private billboard space preparatory to 
government's acquiring the land on which the billboard ex- 
i s t ~ ; ' ~  or when a Brooklyn governmental plan creates tax for- 
feiture foreclosures of private rental property in order to assist 
the city's sanctioned renewal  developer^;^^ or when an up- 
scale California municipality uses zoning regulations to block 
out a low-cost, dense housing development targeted for middle- 
class and blue-collar residents;" where an Iowa city engages 
in mixtures of annexation and repeated rezoning to forestall 
the planned development of an outlying industrial park." All 
of these and a host of similar cases typify this final Takings 
Clause cluster.83 
111. THE R.I.B.E. CONUNDRUM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
Market value is driven by land use laws to a very material 
extent." When a private person (or even a government entity) 
78. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1101 (1984). 
79. See Texas v. S.C., a Texas Ltd. Partnership, Case No. 585530, Harris 
County Civil Court of Law No. 3. (One of the co-authors is an investor and part- 
ner in the defendant). 
80. Archer Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Ctr. Dev. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 609 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
81. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 
447 U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1987). 
82. Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1995-96 (8th Cir. 1983). 
83. See supra note 3. Configuration A shows the relationship between the 
seven Takings Clause clusters. 
84. When defining the concept of marketable title for purposes of title insur- 
ance, the American Land Title Association ("ALTA") has devised certain formal 
exceptions to coverage which, significantly, include all governmental land regulation 
laws and other property laws which may have an impact upon the saleability of 
the property. See SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW 528-34 (1992). It is 
an axiom of property valuation techniques that the burden of encumbrances upon a 
parcel of land directly diminishes property value. In many litigated zoning battles, 
the underlying impetus has historically been the difference in property value be- 
tween lands subject to  a particular use restriction created by governmental ordi- 
nance or regulation and lands free of such regulation. See Nedow v. City of Cam- 
bridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); EDITH J. FRIEDMAN, ENCYCLOPEDLA OF REAL Es- 
TATE APPRAISING 164, 365, 684, 1011 (1968); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic and Legal h l y s i s ,  86 YALE L.J. 385, 490-92 (1977). 
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acquires an interest in real property (or expends funds in the 
capital improvement of an existing interest), they may be said 
to acquire Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
("R.I.B.E.").~~ It is then, as a t  no other time in commercial ac- 
tivity, that constitutional rights intersect with the market- 
place? 
The operative word in R.I.B.E. is "reasonable." To deter- 
mine "reasonableness" one must ask which value-defining ex- 
pectations are credible within the range of all possible schemes 
for land use a t  the moment of investment." Would a reason- 
able actor in the marketplace ignore local, private, and public 
nuisance laws which prohibit any economically viable use?" 
Would an  actor reasonably ignore existing zoning and subdivi- 
sion code prohibitions, or the possibility of favorable or adverse 
85. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992). 
For a stunning illustration of some unpleasant but vital R.1.B.E.-driven truths 
about capital investment in land and its effects on economic behavior, consider the 
recent conduct by the South Carolina Coastal Council. After successive legal defeats 
in the Lucas case, the Council recently settled the matter and purchased the fee 
simple title to the Lucas lands for $1.5 million. Eschewing its former regulatory 
behavior, the Council promptly canceled its open spacelerosion control regulatory 
scheme and decided to  market the lands for private residential development in 
order to recoup its capital investment. The Council's array of ecology-preserving 
principles was of insufficient weight once cash was actually on the line. Richard 
Miniter, The Shifting Ground of Property Rights, INSIGHT MAG., Aug. 23 1993, at  
4, 9. 
86. The quest for a determination of fair market value, by definition, includes 
the concept of the marketplace. This is identical to the calculation of value at a 
given point in time pursuant to whatever equation is used for purposes of Reason- 
able Investment-Backed Expectations ("R.I.B.E."). It is predicated upon the reason- 
able, lawful expectations of a property owner at  the time in question, and the 
search is to determine the value of the land which has been lost to governmental 
regulation, either permanently or temporarily, and for which compensation must be 
paid pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900; and upon 
remand, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
88. NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: 
LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER $8 5A.14, 5A.15; see also MANDELKER, supra 
note 45, $8 6.05, 6.08, 6.13-6.15. Although the United States Supreme Court stayed 
away fiom zoning decisions for half a century subsequent to Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), a very rich body of law has developed with regard 
to zoning changes in state practice. There is considerable emphasis on the status 
of the existing zoning regulations, appropriate terms for the amortization of non- 
conforming improvements or businesses established in reliance upon previous zon- 
ing regulations, and the interaction between private use restrictions and zoning 
regulations. By and large, this body of law reflects a series of accommodations 
between the public desire for changed land use and respect for the private invest- 
ments made previously in reliance upon the pre-existing status of land regulations. 
See MANDELKER, supra note 45, $8 5.65, 9.20. 
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zoning changes, or the future enactment of seriously adverse 
environmental res t r i~ t ions?~~ Such laws affect value because 
they modify the reasonable expectations of the actor in the 
marketplace with an impact equal to such important elements 
as location, availability of financing, and technical marketabili- 
ty of title.g0 
A. Which Laws? 
R.I.B.E. determinations are relevant in all Takings Clause 
settings, not merely in the "categorical formulation" found in 
L u ~ a s . ~ '  Nevertheless, the Lucas case comes closer than any 
other decision to fixing the scope of those laws that help to 
define the R.I.B.E. of any real property.g2 At first blush one 
would assume that principles of realism require the following 
be examined as the basis of any R.I.B.E.: 
(1) Marketplace realism which looks to all value-affecting 
laws, ordinances and regulations from state, local, or federal 
sources.g3 F'rom this perspective, the experienced real estate 
practitioner would be aware of such divergent laws as the cur- 
rent local zoning,g4 subdivision and building codes, state flood 
control reg~lations:~ the federal Americans with Disabilities 
and an array of environmental laws from all levels of 
89. See MANDELKER, supra note 45, §$ 6.05, 6.08. 
90. See supra note 88. 
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
92. Id. at 2901, 2902 n.18. 
93. Title insurance is a standardized industry, by and large, throughout the 
nation with American Land Title Association ("ALTA") forms being the most popu- 
lar by a wide margin. ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, REAL ESTATE 
LAW 175 (7th ed. 1979). One also wonders which value-impacting regulations, that 
have no relationship to title itself, would be seen as R.1.B.E.-determining. Would 
the FHA and VA design and subdivision regulations be relevant to R.I.B.E. in 
residential areas? See FRIEDMAN, supra note 84; see also WILLIAMS, supm note 88, 
5A.14. Among lawyers who specialize in commercial real estate development 
projects, it is commonplace when acquiring land to make the acquisition contract 
conditional upon buyer's satisfactory investigations into zoning, soil conditions, and 
potential environmental problems (if not using a straightforward option for these 
same purposes). Accordingly, the R.I.B.E. for such projects are well. along the way 
to definition through party activity before money changes hands between the buyer 
and seller. In fact, of several dozen such commercial transactions that co-author 
Burton has been involved with, virtually none involving sizable investment has 
been without the use of such R.1.B.E.-determining conditions since the late 1970s. 
94. WILLIAMS, supm note 88, 8 5A.14. 
95. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
US. 304 (1987). 
96. 42 U.S.C. 8 12101 (Supp. I1 1990 & Supp. I11 1991). 
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government." 
(2) Legal realism requires the inclusion of the above plus 
all existing case law principles-including Supreme Court and 
other judge-made Takings Clause doctrines which bear on prop- 
erty rights." To the extent that some statist-favoring judicial 
doctrines would permit government to regulate the use of prop- 
erty without payment of just compensation to the landowner, 
R.I.B.E. would be diminished in value." To the extent that 
some privatist-favoring doctrines would prevent uncompensated 
regulations, the value of R.I.B.E. would be enhanced.100 
(3) Legal realism also would import the wide variety of 
judge-made doctrines regarding valuation which have evolved 
in direct eminent domain cases.lol Eminent domain doctrines 
97. R.I.B.E., realistically computed, would include a lawyer-like inquiry into 
such value-impacting regulations of land use and development as Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or 
"Superfind Act"), 42 U.S.C. 8 9601 (1988); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 
(1988), and similar federal or state laws and regulations which often substantially 
affect the use (and hence the value) of any parcel of land located in the United 
States. Although the U.S. Highway Beautification Act originally anticipated the use 
of eminent domain by the states to remove billboards, screen junk yards, and oth- 
erwise create aesthetically visual easements along the interstate highway system, 
many states seek to use police power regulations to amortize billboard investments 
and remove these "eyesores." 23 U.S.C. 5 131 (1988); KRATOVIL & WERNER, supra 
note 93. This presents an interesting "federalism" of laws impacting R.I.B.E. deter- 
minations along the interstate system. 
98. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) 
( K e ~ e d y ,  J., concurring in judgment). 
99. I t  is important, in this regard, to note that even Justice Scalia, in his 
opinion in Nollan, conceded that a variety of forms of government exactions upon 
the use of private property would be constitutionally sustained by the Court. 483 
US. 825, 834, 836 (1987). Moreover, in Lucas, Justice Scalia recognized in dicta a t  
least two areas where the governmental entities could prohibit all use and thereby 
deprive the owner of all value without the payment of just compensation: prohibit- 
ing illegal activities such as breweries on the property and destroying property in 
order to prevent destruction or death in surrounding areas under the "firebreak" 
notions. 112 S. Ct. a t  2899 11.14, 2900 n.16. Accordingly, the R.I.B.E. must be 
determined with a firm recognition that not merely local nuisance and property 
laws are applicable, but the entire evolving body of Takings Clause jurisprudence 
emanating from the Supreme Court in recent times applies as well. 
100. The concept of the "categorical formulation" set forth in Lucas is a prime 
example of the private property owner's rights pursuant to the Takings Clause 
being accorded a position paramount to state regulation. 112 S. Ct. at  2895. More- 
over, the per se rule found in Loretto also accords the private property owner a 
nearly absolute position to demand compensation for governmental activities having 
an impact upon property value, regardless of the trivial nature of such impact. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US.  419, 434-35 (1982). 
101. See MANDELKER, supra note 45, $8 8.19-8.23; PATRICK J. ROHAN & 
MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN $5 12.01[3], 12.01[5] (Toby P. 
Brigham & Gideon Kunner eds., rev. 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. 
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control such matters as  the potential for zoning changes and 
variances, whether favorable102 or unfavorable to the land- 
owner,lo3 partial takings and remainder parcels.'" Estoppel 
principles and other pertinent legal or equitable doctrines could 
also be rationally imported into R.I.B.E. analysis.lo5 
Although R.I.B.E. determinations seem to cry out for the 
use of such principles, ironically Lucas is not an  opinion 
steeped in legal or marketplace realism, but quite the con- 
trary.'06 Justice Scalia's opinion, taken as  a whole, sets forth 
the following, strikingly narrow, R.1.B.E.-determining measure- 
ments: 
(1) Pre-existent Takings Clause jurisprudence, especially 
statist-favoring principles of the harm-prevention line of cases, 
will not be looked to in R.I.B.E. determinations.lo7 
(2) Exceptions may (or may not) exist for emergency action 
doctrines and prohibiting unlawful activities as a surviving 
residue of the harm-prevention cluster of doctrine.'" 
(3) The relevant law to be examined is local property and 
tort iaw.log 
(4) With substantial borrowings from the Restatement of 
Property, Lucas sets forth a six-element test for determining 
the extent to which local property and tort law depress the 
R.I.B.E. value.' lo 
102. See NICHOLS, supra note 101, $ 12C.02[31. 
103. Id. 
104. MANDELKER, supra note 45, §$ 8.19-8.23; NICHOLS, supra note 101, 
$5 7:8.05[2][C] n.73, 12D.10[31. 
105. For example, there exists a line of cases where conduct by the municipal 
government gives rise to estoppel of the government and a result more favorable to 
the landowner, although such estoppel principles are very narrowly applied. See 
MANDELKER, supra note 45, $§ 6.14-6.20; NICHOLS, supra note 101, §§ 8.20[21, 
8.20[3]. 
106. The separate concurring opinion by Justice K e ~ e d y  is quite informative 
in this regard. 112 S. Ct. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
107. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at  2897-99. 
108. Id. at 2899 11.14, 2900 n.16. 
109. Id. at 2900, 2901-02. 
110. The six factors to be weighed, according to Justice Scalia's majority opin- 
ion, could lead to something of a paradox. The normal presumption-burden of proof 
allocation of regulatory takings law results in a decision favorable to government 
"if any state of fads either known or which could be reasonably assumed affords 
support for it." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (citing United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)). Accordingly, as things 
stand now, the burden of proof is upon the private property owner, not the govern- 
ment, and any missing factors from Justice Scalia's six-element formula for deter- 
mining R.I.B.E. would be resolved favorably to the government until such presump- 
tion and burden are changed. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6. 
PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING 
Because the Lucas facts involved the unique situation 
where 100% of the land's value had been lost to the govern- 
mental regulation, one might argue that the R.1.B.E.-determin- 
ing formula is not meant to apply to the "normal" situation 
where less than 100% of value has been lost."' This narrow 
reading of Lucas is not warranted in view of the powerN re- 
cent momentum in reconfiguration of the Takings Clause. 
B. Laws As of When? 
Local tort and property laws that determine R.I.B.E. are 
not deemed to be fluid or susceptible of adaptation. Under 
Lucas these laws are looked to as of the time the landowner 
acquired R.1.B.E.-an approach to the law as if frozen in am- 
ber."' This curious result is perhaps an unintended byprod- 
uct of Justice Scalia's repugnance for the harm-prevention 
cluster of statist-favoring cases. One way in which he deals 
with this inconvenient body of law is to deny its force rather 
than face up to a direct elimination or severe modification of 
the harm-prevention d~ctrine. ' '~ The reason for this unrealis- 
tic approach is obvious: if the Lucas Court had openly over- 
ruled or modified the harm-prevention line of cases it would 
111. Considerable dicta in Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that neither 100% 
of all of the parcel of land need be taken, nor 100% of all the value-perhaps just 
100% of the value of a single strand of property right within the bundle will suf- 
fice. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
112. Id. at 2899. 
113. Justice Scalia repeatedly diminishes the force of the Mugler-type line of 
cases represented in the second cluster. He indicates that they were merely early 
historical expressions of some general notions of the police power. Id. at 2896-97. 
He ignores the existence of any categorical doctrine favoring government while 
conceding that much language in earlier cases may have indicated that a govern- 
mental preference did exist. Id. at 2897. Contradictions are strewn throughout the 
opinion and other opinions in which Justice Scalia has joined. For example, even 
in Lucas he suggests at various points that the "firebreak" doctrine would probably 
continue to exist as a part of the second cluster. Id. at 2900 n.16. He further 
suggests that the absolute prohibition by government of illegal activities such as 
beer breweries, without the payment of compensation, would continue to exist as a 
part of the harm-prevention cluster. Id. at 2899 n.14. 
Moreover, in First English Evanagelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 304 (1987), Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opin- 
ion, where the Court explicitly stated that it was remanding the case for determi- 
nation of whether the government would be insulated from the requirement to pay 
just compensation even though all useful value was taken from the property (clear- 
ly what Justice Scalia in Lucas calls a "categorical formulation*) because such 
activity by government was insulated against payment under the harm-prevention 
doctrine of Mugler and its progeny. Id. at '318-20. 
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have created a precedent for the alteration of R.1.B.E.-deter- 
mining laws.114 By openly eliminating a statist-favoring doc- 
trine in Lucas, Justice Scalia would have established the prece- 
dent for eliminating a privatist-favoring doctrine in some fu- 
ture cases, and this would make the R.I.B.E. formula subject to 
future Takings Clause cases. 
The Court's current (and mostly correct) privatist-oriented 
view of the Takings Clause would be jeopardized by any prece- 
dent that suggested future changes in case law could affect any 
R.I.B.E. 'I5 To avoid this hazard, the R.1.B.E.-affecting laws 
are fixed in time. 
C. Losses of Less Than 100% of Value 
As previously noted, Lucas represents the highly unusual 
fact of a loss of 100% of property v a l u ~ r  a t  least such was 
the factual basis of the Supreme Court's decision.ll6 But what 
of the more "normal" circumstance? Is Lucas susceptible of 
being extended to such cases? The opinion in Lucas strongly 
suggests that the R.I.B.E. determination formula will be mate- 
rial to lesser value lotkes."' 
First, in some textual and footnoted exchanges between the 
Lucas majority and the dissenting Justices, it appears that 
although the "categorical formulation" of Lucas is only trig- 
gered by 100% loss,11s the R.I.B.E. formulation is not.llg 
Moreover, the all-points attack on the harm-prevention line of 
cases strongly suggests that Lucas addresses more than the 
rare case where 100% of property value has been 10st . l~~ 
In addition, Lucas lays down several highly visible mark- 
ers which signal that 100% loss may be defined as less than 
100% in future cases. Much Lucas dicta expressly identifies a 
number of concepts which would allow such a result. For in- 
114. Justice Scalia faced a logical dilemma. If he had realistically stated that 
the harm-prevention line of cases flowing from Mugler was being set aside or sub- 
stantially diminished in Lucas, this would lead to the conclusion that takings law 
could be modified by the Court in a fashion which has an impact upon 
R.1.B.E.-though such impact in Lucas would be favorable to the private property 
owner. 
115. Supra note 114. 
116. Lucas, 112 S .  Ct. at 2889, 2896. 
117. See supra note 111: 
118. 112 S .  Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
119. Id. 
120. See supra note 111, 
8271 PWDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING 849 
stance, the Lucas opinion actively speculates as to whether a 
100% loss, not of the entire fee simple but of only one strand 
from the bundle of rights, would open to the private landowner 
the new constitutional protection of the "categorical formula- 
tion."l2' Prior decisions such as Penn Central12' and Key- 
stone,'= according to Lucas, never foreclosed this "single 
strand" gambit by the private owner.'" 
Moreover, Lucas dicta also speculates about the issue of a 
100% value loss on a strip of land that is a part of a larger 
parcel.lZ5 If a strip of land-less than the entire private 
owner's parcel-loses 100% of its value because of government 
regulation, Lucas hints that the "categorical formulation" may 
protect the 1ando~ner. l~~ (This would certainly bring into 
play the existing body of takings lore that deals with partial 
takings, severance damages, statist-favoring statutory rules of 
compensation such as those in Arkansas,12' and some consti- 
tutionally profound questions about smaller tracts as self-suffi- 
cient economic units within larger parcels of land.)''' 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
putation 
See supra note 111. 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
Id. at 2894 n.7; see NICHOLS, supra note 101, 5 12B.14[4]. 
112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. 
Arkansas, for example, has a statutory "before-and-after" method of com- 
designed to subtract from the taking damages awarded to the landowner 
the amount of any enhancement in value of the remainder parcel attributable to 
the public project. Property Owners Improvement Dist. v. Williford, 843 S.W.2d 
862, 866 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992). Consider whether such a statute is constitutionally 
appropriate where predatory government gamesmanship has been present in the 
taking process. In those condemnation actions where both government and the 
private landowner concede that the remainder parcel lost some value, then a "be- 
fore-and-after" test would seem appropriate to determine aggregate loss to the 
entire tract. Morales v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 843 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992). 
128. Generally, the determination of fair market value when less than the 
entire tract is taken presents a series of technical questions, some of which are 
often deemed to be fact issues and some of which are deemed to be questions of 
law grounded in constitutional protections: 
(1) The value of the strip of land taken measured by all uses-including the 
highest and best use to which it could reasonably be adapted within the foresee- 
able future-represents a portion of the total fair market value. 
(2) The increased value of the remainder, if enhanced by reason of the public 
project, will not be used as a setoff against the just compensation due to the land- 
owner. 
(3) The decreased value of the remainder resulting from severance from the 
condemned land will be an additional element of compensation. 
(4) In many cases the question of value turns on the size and configuration of 
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In  both instances, Lucas leaves the door conspicuously 
open to later enlargement of the private owner's rights where 
less than 100% of the fee simple value of the entire tract is lost 
to regulation. Whether such an  enlargement will come to in- 
clude the absolute privatist protections of the "categorical for- 
mulation" found in Lucas is uncertain, but on balance the dicta 
lean that way.lZg Given these open invitations to private own- 
ers, it would be foolhardy for a private owner faced with preda- 
tory municipal regulatory conduct to ignore using the "categori- 
cal formulation," even where less than 100% of the land area 
was taken by government's predatory  regulation^.'^^ I t  would 
be equally foolish to ignore Lucas's R.1.B.E .-determining formu- 
la in a predatory takings case where one of the property rights 
strands, but not a discrete parcel of land, was taken.13' 
D. A Potential R.I.B.E. Synthesis 
The existence of Lucas's frozen-in-amber time frame as to 
the relevant body of R.1.B.E.-determining law and its myopic 
approach of looking only to local tort and property law are not 
dispositive of other existing doctrines.'" First, the sources of 
a self-sufficient economic unit ("unit"), which must be determined as to the value 
of the strip taken and also as to the value of the remainder. 
(5) Sometimes (i) the. strip taken is itself a "unit"; sometimes (ii) the strip 
taken plus some but not all of the remaining entire tract is the appropriate "unit"; 
(iii) sometimes the entire tract including the strip taken is the appropriate "unit." 
(6) Some jurisdictions allow the landowner unilaterally to waive severance dam- 
ages, and have value turn solely upon class (5)(i); and some even allow the land- 
owner unilaterally to select class (5)(ii). The landowner's key strategy will be to 
avoid averaging the value of some larger portion of land than the strip taken 
when this will yield a lower value for the strip taken because the remainder's 
value is lower than that of the strip alone. 
(7) Accordingly, selection of the appropriate "unit" can be crucial to  valuation. 
Some jurisdictions will allow the government to present evidence to the jury of 
what constitutes the appropriate "unit" rather than a unilateral designation by the 
landowner. 
When predatory municipal conduct creates the taking, it may be particularly 
inimical to the policies of the Takings Clause to allow the state to thereafter op- 
pose the landowner's selection of the appropriate economic "unit." Such could result 
in averaging the value of a less valuable remainder parcel with a more valuable 
taken strip, thus arriving at  a fair market value for the taken strip which does 
not reflect its reasonable fair market value either standing alone as a "unit" or as 
part of some ideal, smaller-than-everything "unit." See State v. Windham, 837 
S.W.2d 73, 76-78 (Tex. 1992); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d 
466, 471 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); NICHOLS, supra note 101, $ 12.03[1]. 
129. 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95. 
130. See supra note 128. 
131. 112 S. Ct. at  2895 n.8. 
132. I t  could be argued that local property law, broadly defined, would include 
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R.1.B.E.-determining laws need not necessarily be limited to 
local tort and property law. The open invitation found in Lucas 
for private owners to further explore the possibilities of utiliz- 
ing the "categorical formulation" for losses of less than 100% of 
property value admits that further judicial refinement will 
have a major impact.lsg Such an invitation is a tacit acknowl- 
edgment that evolving Takings Clause legal doctrines bear 
directly upon the R.I.B.E. calculus.134 For this and other rea- 
sons noted below, local tort and property law cannot truly be 
intended to be the sole sources of law for R.I.B.E. determina- 
tions. 
In addition, it seems reasonable that some of Lucas's six 
R.1.B.E.-determining elements are broad enough or pliable 
enough to import into them some of the elements of legal real- 
ism otherwise excluded from that 0pini0n.l~~ Moreover, Jus- 
tice Kennedy's separate concurring opinion also illustrates 
receptivity to a broader spectrum of legal sources, even among 
privatist-oriented J u s t i ~ e s . ' ~  For example, the Restatement 
of Property's inquiry into questions of suitability or social value 
of the private owner's uses (as part of the R.1.B.E.-determining 
legal inquiry) appears to allow inquiry into law and regulations 
beyond local tort and property law.13' The Restatement inqui- 
ries into new or changed circumstances or new knowledge also 
lend themselves to examining a broader range of regulatory 
laws? The inquiry into uniformity or equal protection issues 
any laws and regulations which affect real property value. In other words, Justice 
Scalia could assert, in defense of his limitation to local law, a notion that federal 
statutes and decisions which have any impact upon property value are embraced 
within the notion of local property law. If thus broadly defined, the objections 
raised by Justice Kennedy in the separate concurring opinion would become moot. 
112 S. Ct. at 2895, 2903. 
133. See supra note 114. 
134. See supra not4 98 and accompanying text. 
135. Compare Lucas, 112 S. Ct. a t  2900-01 with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623, 664 (1887); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 US. 
590, 592 (1962); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
485 (1987). 
136. Contrast Justice Ke~edy 's  receptivity with the healthy hostility towards 
legislative determinations found in Justice Scalia's Lwas opinion. 112 S. Ct. at  
2898 n.12 (only a "stupid staff' of a legislature would fail to be artful enough to 
fit Justice Blackmuds standard); id. at 2899 n.14 (legislatures may go about "plun- 
dering landowners"). 
137. Id. at 2901. 
138. The Restatement of Property's material criteria are the same as the case 
law. For instance, Miller examines the degree of harm to nearby private property 
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respecting dissimilar regulatory treatment of other landowners 
also opens the door to  much non-local constitutional doc- 
trine.13' 
In light of all this, Lucas cannot rationally be read as hav- 
ing fixed a definitive and final limit on the laws germane t o  
R.I.B.E. calculations. 140 
E. R.I.B.E. Timing and Predatory Municipal Practices 
Naturally, not all governmental regulatory conduct which 
occurs amid land value fluctuations amounts to  a compensable 
taking. Normal delays involving zoning or other legislative 
activity do not work a compensable regulatory taking, even 
though property values may drop.'" Such fluctuations are 
among the ordinary incidents of o~nership.'~' Predatory mu- 
nicipal gamesmanship is quite another matter for purposes of 
Takings Clause analysis.'43 Exactly when is a private 
landowner's property taken by predatory municipal actions that 
constitute a regulatory taking cause of action in inverse con- 
demnation? The R.I.B.E. calculus found in Lucas would lead to 
the conclusion that the date of private acquisition or other 
investment is the critical date for R.I.B.E. ~alculation.'~~ 
However, such a reading can be traced to the particular factual 
circumstances of Lucas. At the time Lucas acquired the land, 
the then-existing land regulations allowed him to  build a sin- 
("serious injury" to commercial apple orchards within a two-mile radius of the 
claimant's property); the social value of claimant's land use activities (ornamental 
and timber use of relatively small value compared to the apple industry's suitabili- 
ty to  the locality in question); ease of harm avoidance measures (a necessity test 
under which the state entomologist determines whether cedar tree destruction will 
be ,  necessary to protect nearby apple orchards); longevity of claimant's use or 
changed circumstances in the locale, or new knowledge making former permissible 
use no longer permissible (the scientifically established details underlying the en- 
actment of the statute and the need for ten neighbors to request an investigation 
show both elements to be present). 276 U.S. at 277-80. For similar factor-weighing, 
see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-97 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394, 410-14 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657-63 (1887); First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 
899-901 (Ct. App. 1989). 
139. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
140. See supra note 138. 
141. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 320 (1987). 
142. Id. 
143. See supra note 3. 
144. 112 S. Ct. at 2899-900. 
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gle-family re~idence.'~~ Subsequently enacted land use re- 
strictions prohibited construction (and the courts below deter- 
mined that the property owner had been deprived of all effec- 
tive use of the land, hence 100% of its value).'46 Thus, the 
R.I.B.E. inquiry formulated by the Lucas Court would look only 
to  the tort and property laws bearing upon the land's value at  
the time of Lucas's acquisition.14' 
This formulation would not be suitable, however, in many 
instances of predatory regulatory takings. For example, sup- 
pose that a private owner has owned a strip of land parallel to 
a highway for, many years. Its current use is quite valuable 
since it is rented to a nearby business for parking o r  for sign 
pylons and billboards. As is customary in such transactions, the 
rent escalates periodically, and the capitalized value of those 
increased rents'48 represents a large and rising fair market 
value to the owner. Suppose that, in order to condemn the strip 
of land in the future for highway expansion purposes, various 
agencies of government collaborate in a predatory fashion to 
dislodge the tenant by altering the signage ordinance or revok- 
ing the signage permit. If a court determined that these pre- 
condemnation steps were taken to  destroy private value to 
obtain a future public right-of-way expansion at a lower price, 
then relief would likely be available under the seventh cluster 
of Takings Clause doctrines.'49 
Under such predatory circumstances, the more appropriate 
way to calculate R.I.B.E. would be to look to the legal status of 
the property as it existed just before the municipal governing 
bodies began their predatory activities.'" It would not be sen- 
sible to value the land on the earlier dates when it was fmst 
acquired or when the improvements were first built. After all, 
145. Id. at 2889. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 2900. 
148. FRIEDMAN, supm note 84, at  677-78 (listing the factors to be considered 
in leaseholds). 
149. See cases cited supra notes 3-5. 
150. In this connection, it is significant to note the Court's increasing skepti- 
cism towards local governmental land use regulations. The heightened judicial 
scrutiny, the necessity for overcoming the historical presumptions of correctness of 
governmental regulation, and the heavy weight the Court attaches to long-standing 
property rights inherent in fee simple ownership, all argue in favor of granting the 
landowner the benefit of values at the earliest possible date prior to the com- 
mencement of predatory activities. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 n.12, 2899-900 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
483 U.S. 825, 831, 837, 840-41 (1987). 
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the reasonable economic expectations of an  owner with im- 
provements in place, a lease signed, and a tenant in occupancy 
are certainly not less than the fair market value of such in- 
come-producing property immediately before the government 
began its predatory actions.151 The earlier date of raw land 
acquisition would not represent the reality of the R.I.B.E. base- 
line. Accordingly, the status of law applicable to income-gener- 
ating property when predatory conduct first began seems the 
only sensible R.1.B.E.-determining body of law to be investigat- 
ed. In a normal market, this method of R.I.B.E. calculation will 
protect the owner's increasing values, and such a result harmo- 
nizes with the overall anti-statist philosophy of lucas.'" 
F. R.I.B.E. and Temporary or Permanent Regulatory Taking 
First English established, among other things, that the 
private property owner's cause of action for regulatory taking is 
derived directly from the Constitution and is available for both 
temporary and permanent takings.'53 In 1992 the South Car- 
olina court, upon remand in Lucas, dealt with the element of 
temporary takings in a detailed fashion? The court identi- 
fied prior periods of time for which just compensation was due 
for temporary takings and expressly identified future possible 
temporary takings dependent upon future governmental regula- 
tory 
This feature leads to the inquiry as to exactly how the 
R.I.B.E. formulation should be dealt with for a period of tempo- 
rary predatory taking. The logic inherent in the Lucas analysis 
151. To the extent that the Takings Clause has been interpreted over the past 
century to include a prohibition of governmental regulation which destroys private 
land values or otherwise interferes with the enjoyment of the fee simple in the 
fashion as indicated in Clusters 1 through 7, see znfm Conflguration A, the choice 
of any date which yields a minimal return to the property owner subsequent to 
the commencement of predatory steps by the government would frustrate the judi- 
cial tendencies pursuant to Cluster 1, Cluster 5, and Cluster 7. This would be 
highly unlikely when the government itself has precipitated the regulation through 
predatory conduct, not merely through some Euclidian zoning principle or other 
protected statist activities. 
152. Lucas emphasizes its skepticism of value-destroying governmental activi- 
ties throughout the opinion. See, e.g., 112 S. Ct. at 2894, 2895 n.8, 2898 11.12, 
2900, 2901-02. 
153. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 315, 318 (1987). 
154. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (S.C. 
1992). 
155. Id. 
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leads to  several conclusions. First, predatory governmental 
conduct is most often achieved by means of local land use regu- 
latory activities; hence, on the surface, the R.I.B.E. calculation 
under Lucas would seemingly include such value-affecting 
 regulation^.'^^ However, because it is the very predatory reg- 
ulation itself that generates a regulatory taking, the R.I.B.E. 
cannot include all municipal use of regulatory power. Because 
the predatory regulatory takings cases usually include not one 
but an interwoven series of governmental acts (discouraging 
tenants, revising zoning or building ordinances, crimping fire 
and police protection, limiting access, harassing inspections 
being among the most frequent tactics employed by local gov- 
ernment~),'~' it may be necessary to seek to sort out some 
non-predatory R.1.B.E.-affecting laws from others which are 
predatory. This would be a statist-benefitting approach since 
local laws and regulations would not be invidious if they were 
not part of a pattern of predatory regulation. Some sorting out 
would be needed. The Lucas opinion brushed aside the historic 
deference to legislative action. There is a long and, until recent- 
ly, potent tradition of honoring the presumption of legislative 
correctness in zoning and other land use regulation cas- 
es-although this presumption has been called into ques- 
tion.15' A shift in the presumption of legislative correctness 
might be appropriate to force the government to carry the bur- 
den of sorting out the predatory from non-predatory conduct to 
determine when the predatory conduct commenced.'" 
A more privatist-oriented view of this issue is also possible. 
The Supreme Court has expressed strong skepticism towards 
governmental conduct in Takings Clause cases. The Court has 
indicated its "closer judicial scrutiny" of the heightened risks to 
156. It is important to note that, literally, Justice Scalia referred to local tort 
and property law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-902. However, the ability of local 
government to affect property uses, and hence property values, through local ordi- 
nance and regulation is a t  the very core of the Takings Clause evolution. It would 
constitute a supreme paradox if, in fad, these value-diminishing regulations and 
ordinances were in effect permitted to undermine private values simultaneously 
with their being the core of a challenge to the conduct by the government itself 
pursuant to the Cluster 7 predatory cases. See supra notes 3-5. 
157. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
159. The judicial skepticism noted above tends powerfully to push towards a 
reassignment of presumptions and burdens of proof. See Bruce W. Burton, Predato- 
ry Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the 
Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK E. REV. 65, 96-105 (1991). 
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private rights whenever government attempts land use exac- 
tions; the majority's recent cynicism about legislative motives 
in this area is not masked. Thus, if the Court finds a predatory 
pattern of regulatory actions, perhaps all local laws should be 
excluded from R.I.B.E. calculations-an extreme privatist-ori- 
ented outcome, 160 
Such an outcome could be possible, even likely. The 
Rehnquist-Scalia combination has exercised extraordinary force 
in Takings Clause matters in recent years.l6l If that power 
center remains intact, and since predatory municipal conduct 
presents the local legislative body in its most unflattering and 
rent-seeking light, not much in the way of judicial deference 
toward local ordinances and regulations should be expected in 
R.I.B.E. cal~ulations. '~~ This could prove to be a large eco- 
nomic benefit to the private landowner since the parcel's value 
would be calculated subject only to local tort law restrictions 
and, perhaps, some prior benign zoning which pre-dates the 
government's predatory abuses.lm 
Quite ap& from these important policy features and the 
issues concerning presumptions and burdens of proof lies the 
question of how value calculations should be approached in the 
many variables of predatory regulation cases which now fall 
within the purview of the Court's new R.I.B.E. exposition. 
IV. THE MECHANICS OF VALUE CALCULATIONS 
b 
Payment of "just compensation" is the constitutional re- 
quirement for both direct eminent domain and the indirect 
confiscation of private property rights by regulatory tak- 
ings? In the area of conventional eminent domain (a 
straightforward condemnation without government's regulatory 
conduct being a t  issue), there is a considerable body of doctrine 
concerning value determinations. The fact that formal condem- 
160. In the event that the Court, led by Justice Scalia, is intent upon crushing 
the last vestiges of Cluster 2, such an extreme position could be expected. Howev- 
er, within the anti-statist camp with respect to Takings Clause questions, Justices 
O'Co~or ,  K e ~ e d y ,  and Souter appear moderately inclined in this regard. See 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at  2902, 2925; Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531- 
34 (1992). 
161. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at  2902, 2925; Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 
1522, 1531-34 (1992). 
162. Compare supra notes 3-5 with note 150. 
163. See 112 S. Ct. at  2901. 
164. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960). 
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nation proceedings are not instituted does not change the es- 
sential nature of the claim, and the condemnee's rights are not 
qualified by the form of the remedy.lB5 Since 1987, private 
causes of action to recover just compensation for regulatory 
takings and conventional condemnations have both been direct- 
ly grounded in the identical provisions of the Fifth Amend- 
ment.lB6 As such, virtually identical calculations should be 
used to determine the value of the property rights appropriated 
by government in both types of  taking^.'^' 
The critical issue is whether the rules governing "valuation 
timing" protect the private property rights embraced by the 
Fifth Amendment so as to encourage investment by discourag- 
ing the state's predatory misuse of its vast regulatory powers. 
In theory at least, the timing of such valuation could be pegged 
at one of six possible, and widely distinct, moments. Logically, 
an individual's R.I.B.E. for property being condemned could be 
valued at the time of (i) original acquisition, (ii) the most recent 
investment for capital improvements, (iii) formal state action 
announcing or designating the project, (iv) actual predatory 
state conduct, (v) the court or condemnation commission's 
award determination, or (vi) the actual payment of the award. 
The correct choice of timing sigdicantly impacts the calcula- 
tion of the value being determined. 
Because diminution of the value of the property taken by 
government is at the very core of any pattern of municipal 
predatory land regulation, the landowner in such a scenario 
must make calculations involving several considerations. 
A. Interests Taken 
Just compensation is required for takings of any interest in 
property.'@ The taking of a property interest amounting to 
less than fee ownership requires compensation measured by 
the extent of the interest taken?' Consideration of Lucas's 
new "categorical formulation" and its potential application to  
takings of less than all strands of the fee simple needs to be 
165. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). 
166. ,First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
167. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse CO: v. United States, 409 U S .  
470, 473-74 (1973). 
168. Zinsmeyer v. State, 646 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
169. Fordyce v. Wolfe, 18 S.W. 145 (Tex. 1891). 
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factored into the calculus of any regulatory taking. 
In Texas, ancillary losses, such as the regulatory depriva- 
tion of special values attributable to the property's unique 
suitability for the conduct of a particular business, can be in- 
troduced as evidence in establishing the market value of just 
compensation. Some states liberally permit wide-ranging 
evidence, by statute or constitution. For example, while Texas 
eminent domain statutes allow compensation for damages to 
real property only, the Texas Constitution provides for compen- 
sation for the taking, damaging, or destruction of all species of 
property. This includes, importantly, any unreasonable or un- 
necessary damage to a business, even one whose value consists 
exclusively of good will, such as a restaurant.17' The Texas 
Constitution also provides for compensation for lost profits in 
some instan~es."~ 
In City of Austin v. Casiraghi, the court held that such 
constitutional damages need to  be pled as a separate cause of 
action to  be joined in the statutory condemnation action.173 It 
should be noted that Texas is one of the majority of states 
which constitutionally mandate compensation for both the 
property taken and damage to or destruction of the reminder 
of the property caused by governmental action.lT4 Texas re- 
quires damages t o  be valued by the same willing buyer-seller 
standard as is used to  value takings.175 
B. Considerations in Picking the Date of Property Valuation 
It  is critical to the spirit of the emerging Takings Clause 
doctrine that the rules governing "valuation timing" be formu- 
lated to  advance at least two primary societal goals. First, as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the rules should protect 
against uncompensated or unjustly compensated takings of pri- 
vate property rights. Second, timing and valuation rules should 
be properly structured to  encourage investment by discouraging 
the state's predatory gamesmanship or other abuses of the 
governing process. Accordingly, determining the date for mea- 
170. City of Austin v. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
171. L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 233 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Tex. 1950). 
172. See City of Austin v. Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1986). 
173. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d at 579-80. 
174. F. Russell Kendall, Special and Community DamageeA Confusion in 
Definition, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 282, 282 (1972). 
175. City of Austin v. C a ~ i z z o ,  267 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1954). 
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suring fair market value payable to the landowner is particu- 
larly vital when the values have changed during the condemna- 
tion process. Such a determination becomes increasingly diffi- 
cult when the condemnation is not a direct taking but involves 
predatory municipal practices. There are four primary situa- 
tions which may be involved: 
Situation A: The landowner's parcel gains value during 
the proceedings because of economic circumstances unrelat- + 
ed to the public project. For instance, a landowner's farm- 
land becomes more valuable due to an increase in the mar- 
ket price of the crop grown on it. 
Situation B: The parcel appreciates in value during the 
same time period due to the market's anticipation of the 
project's impact, such as the enhanced value due to up- 
graded highway frontage resulting from the project. 
Situation C: During the condemnation process the 
property loses value due to economic circumstances not 
caused by the public project. 
Situation D: The land value drops because of the 
market's anticipation of the project's negative impact on 
the land's productivity. 
As presented in Situation A, the landowner should be able 
to collect the enhanced value attributable only to general eco- 
nomic conditions unrelated to the prospective highway. This 
gain represents a normal benefit of fee simple ownership, and 
"just compensation" would seem to embrace this growth in  
value until the owner has been paid and can invest the 
funds. ' 76 
Under Situation B, the landowner would receive none of 
the enhanced value since all of it was attributable to the public 
project.ln Under Situation C, the decline in value normally 
would be borne by the landowner.'" The loss would also be 
borne by the landowner in Situation D, even if the 
government's predatory conduct consisted of delay which post- 
poned the payment date. However, if such delay were exces- 
~ i v e ' ' ~  or accompanied by either undue governmental inter- 
ference with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property'" 
176. Barshop v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1969). 
177. Id. 
178. State v. Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
179. Barshop, 442 S.W.2d at 685. 
180. Thurow v. City of Dallas, 499 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), 
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or surrounding condemnations which left the targeted parcel as 
an obviously mandatory future taking, the landowner may be 
entitled to c~mpensation.'~' These Texas holdings are square- 
ly consistent with the overall predatory-gamesmanship line of 
cases. 
Under current Texas law, which is somewhat statist-orient- 
ed, the date of value computation usually will be the actual 
date of the award's payment by the government to the land- 
owner.'" Normally this will be the same time as the award 
determination by the commissioners. However, Texas's eminent 
domain statutes require the state to pay a t  that time only if it 
needs to take pos~ession.'~ If either party objects to the 
award, there will be a trial de novo on all issues, including 
value, which normally will not be determined until the award 
is paid.'" This rule opens the door for predatory state con- 
duct prior to  the award's payment. Essentially the state is 
given an option to buy a t  the price of the commissioner's 
award. The state may then object to that award--delay pay- 
ment, withholding its "time-value" from the condemnee-and 
then pay later, either when it needs to take possession or after 
the market value of the land has dropped to reflect the reality 
of the damage caused by the condemnation. 
One thesis of this Article is that such an approach, found 
in some current law, is inconsistent with constitutional takings 
analysis. The historic, underlying policy premises of the Tak- 
ings Clause should, at least, preclude statutes which encourage 
undue delay and predatory conduct by the gove~mment. Fur- 
ther, consistency with the Fifth Amendment demands that 
whenever government is found to have an incentive to  act in a 
predatory or rent-seeking fashion toward the private landown- 
er, the law should require procedural and valuation rules 
which remove the incentive and deter such conduct. 
There is a spectrum of approaches, ranging from extremely 
privatist to moderate orientations, which would help deter such 
predatory abuse of private property rights. The most privatist- 
oriented approach might award all value increases to the land- 
error refhsed n.r.e. (1974). 
181. Uehlinger v. State, 387 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.), error refused 
n.r.e. (1965). 
182. City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. 1974). 
183. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 8 21.041 (West 1984). 
184. Id; $ 21.018. 
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owner and charge all value decreases to the state whenever a 
pattern of predatory state conduct is shown to  exist. Faced with 
such potent protections of private ownership rights, the state 
would be foolish to risk value-depleting regulatory conduct. 
This rule would not interfere with the normal delays or charge 
governments with the value fluctuations which the First Eng- 
lish Court expressly recognized as an incident of ownership. In 
fact, such a rule would fit First English's holding that tempo- 
rary takings and non-permanent interferences with private 
ownership rights are cornpen~able.'~~ 
In situations A and C, a more moderate approach might 
maintain the landowner's rights t o  bear the loss or enjoy the 
reward arising from value changes due to changes in general 
economic circumstances during the condemnation process. How- 
ever, once a pattern of predatory municipal conduct is estab- 
lished by the landowner, the state would bear the burden of 
proof to make clear and convincing showings (1) as to how 
much of any value increase or decrease was due solely to gener- 
al economic conditions wholly unrelated to the public project 
and permissible normal delays which were not part of a preda- 
tory pattern, and (2) that any delay in payment, whether past, 
present, or future, was not part of a continuing pattern of pred- 
atory conduct by government. Absent such showings by the 
state, the landowner would recover all value increases while 
the state would suffer all value decreases. The shift in the 
burden of proof would also deter government's predatory con- 
duct. 
In instances of predatory conduct, the critical period of 
valuation fluctuations should be measured from the earliest 
governmental step which is part of a pattern leading to  the 
deprivation or diminution of the landowner's rights to  the use 
and enjoyment of the private property. For example, in Texas 
case law, where the delay is excessive or the interference with 
property rights is particularly egregious, the rule should pro- 
tect the property owner. 186 
185. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
US.  304, 318-20 (1987). 
186. Uehlinger, 387 S.W.2d at 432. It must be noted, however, that in Texas 
the relevant statutes tend to encourage abuse by predatory governmentcondemnors 
in more subtle ways, and this is not in keeping with the tenor of the opinions in 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; or First English, 482 U.S. 
at 316-17. 
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C. Potential Future Legal Changes Favoring the Owner 
The privatist-oriented decision in Lucas makes it clear that 
changes destroying the legal uses of a property after the cre- 
ation of the owner's R.I.B.E. will not be considered in valuing 
just compensation for the property's taking by r eg~ la t ion . ' ~~  
While the Lucas opinion did not address the other possibili- 
ty-legal changes which might increase va luea t a t e  courts 
have grappled with the question of how to consider potential 
future changes in zoning or other value-impacting land regula- 
tions which might increase the value of lands involved in emi- 
nent domain takings. In other words, what if the R.I.B.E. of a 
private landowner includes, at the moment before government 
commences its predatory conduct, a reasonable expectation that 
zoning will be changed to a more valuable classification? What 
if the landowner has a reasonable expectation that variances or 
permits for a more valuable land use will be issued in the fu- 
ture? 
Courts in both Tennessee and Texas have considered po- 
tential future rezoning for business uses in computing awards 
to residential property owners for tracts taken by city govern- 
ments? In a Texas appellate case, the City of Austin 
charged as error that the factfinder had been allowed to consid- 
er the commercial value of the tract when its commercial use 
would violate valid existing city zoning ordinances. Recognizing 
that "[ilt is a matter of common knowledge that cities fiequent- 
ly lift zoning ordinances or reclass& property in particular 
zones when the business or wants of the community justifies 
that type of action," the court refused to establish a rule bar- 
ring evidence of such property use.lS9 Rather, the court stated 
that the trial judge should admit such evidence if satisfied 
"that the wants and needs of the particular community may 
result, within a reasonable time, in the lifting of restric- 
tions."lgO The jury should consider the evidence related to 
such probability and apply it in arriving at  the market value of 
the property taken.lgl 
187. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
188. State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); City of Austin 
v. Cannizzo, 267 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1954). 
189. Cannizw, 267 S.W.2d at 815. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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This rule has been interpreted in basically two ways. First, 
evidence of the probability of change in restrictions is inadmis- 
sible in the absence of testimony that the proscribed use would 
be the highest and best use of the property taken.'" Second, 
if the court is satisfied that there is no reasonable probability 
that existing zoning restrictions will be changed within a rea- 
sonable time, it should exclude evidence of market value based 
on the property's use for any purpose other than that to which 
it is presently restricted. lg3 
This issue presents the privatist-statist clash in a vivid 
fashion. A statist-oriented lawmaker, stuck with Lucas, would 
argue that since value-eroding land regulations which govern- 
ment may adopt subsequent to the date of R.I.B.E. determina- 
tion are not allowed-at least if such regulations fit within 
Lucas's evolving categorical formulation-then logical consis- 
tency should exclude any such value-enhancing changes as 
well. 
A privatist-oriented lawmaker would respond that logical 
consistency is not the proper question. Given the policy origins 
of the Fifth Amendment, the balance should always weigh most 
heavily towards maximizing the R.I.B.E. formula for calculat- 
ing just compensation of the deprived landowner, particularly 
in predatory situations. Accordingly, reasonably foreseeable 
zoning variances and other changes benefitting the private 
property's value should be part of the R.I.B.E. calculus. 
D. R.I.B.E. and Illegality of Present Uses 
A closely related question deals with the existence of illegal 
uses. For example, in United States v. 320.0 Acres, the govern- 
ment was attempting to disallow compensation for cabins 
which they maintained were illegal.lg4 The Fifth Circuit ruled 
that if the cabins were legal and unobjectionable, the owners 
were entitled to full compensation for them, and when the 
government is attempting to keep the values of existing struc- 
tures from the factfinder on the basis of their illegality, the 
illegality must be established as a threshold issue.lg5 "As a 
192. Continental Dev. Corp. v. State, 337 S.W.2d 371, 373-74 (Tex. Civ. App., 
1960). 
193. Henslee v. State, 375 S.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error 
refused n.r.e. (1964). 
194. 605 F.2d 762, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1979). 
195. Id. 
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preliminary matter, it is the Government's burden to prove that 
a n  existing structure is unlawful and therefore should not, as a 
matter of public policy, be compen~ated."'~~ 
Once that threshold has been achieved, the property owner 
must prove that the structure was built legally with a valid 
permit.19' However, even if the owner fails in that burden, he 
can still introduce evidence that the relevant regulatory au- 
thority would otherwise allow the structure to remain:lg8 
[Clompensation for an existing and otherwise valuable struc- 
ture can be completely denied only if it was an illegal use at 
the time it was built. If it is only by virtue of supervening 
laws and regulations that the structure has become an illegal 
use, the owner does not forfeit his constitutional right to be 
justly compensated for his property.lg9 
Note the parallel between the court's analysis on illegality 
of structures and the essential elements of predatory govern- 
mental gamesmanship. Moreover, in the area of predatory 
gamesmanship, the problem of illegal use is compounded. The 
predatory regulations themselves may make the valuation of 
just compensation more difficult since the market value of the 
structure may have been altered by those laws. "But the diffi- 
culties involved in ascertaining 'just compensation' in these 
circumstances do not warrant denying compensation altogeth- 
er."2w It appears, under the Fifth Circuit's rule, that it would 
be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to exclude consider- 
ation of the value of such a structure on the basis that its pres- 
ent, but not original, illegality would make consideration of the 
now proscribed use speculative, remote, or irrelevant. 
In  the case of predatory regulations, this may be another 
instance where the burden of proof should shift to government. 
Certainly, employing the presumption of constitutional correct- 
ness has no place where predatory governmental activities 
have been involved. I t  would not be an undue burden on the 
municipalities to show that the use was illegal at the time of 
R.I.B.E. determination, and not as the result of predatory regu- 
lation. Moreover, Lucas strongly suggests that, unless the pre- 
196. Id. at 821 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. at 822. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. (emphasis added). 
200. Id. 
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surnption of correctness is put aside, hollow statutory language 
can paper over the fundamental questions, and statist appe- 
tites will remain ~nchecked.~" 
Diminishing the compensable value of property taken for 
public projects is at the heart of predatory municipal regula- 
tions, and declaring an existing use unlawful is merely a subset 
of such predatory practices. An individual's R.I.B.E. for proper- 
ty being condemned could be valued at  any time between the 
property's initial acquisition by the landowner and the taking 
of the property by the state through occupation or deed. Preda- 
tory conduct can be discouraged by rules protecting the proper- 
ty owner's right to just compensation. Otherwise, predatory 
conduct and gamesmanship will be encouraged by rules that 
permit regulatory tactics to  diminish value and reduce compen- 
sation. 
E. Value Determinations, the Evolving Public Project and 
Predatory Municipal Conduct 
Public projects naturally require time to be planned, to 
evolve and to  take shape. Therefore, courts and parties have 
extraordinary dmculty in determining compensability of value 
changes which occur during the course of condemnation, partic- 
ularly those caused by the project. In federal jurisdictions, 
recovery is limited to the amount of value which has accmed to 
the property as of the earliest time that the property can be 
said to lie "probably within the scope of the project."202 I t  is 
a t  this point in time that a taking is considered to have oc- 
c~rred .~O~ 
This is not to say that "mere fluctuations in value during 
the course of governmental decision making" are compensable 
takings by the constitutional standard. In First English, the 
Court observed that "depreciation in value of the property by 
reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the govern- 
ment.'- 
Similarly, in United States v. 2,175.86 Acres, the Fifth 
Circuit held that where government has proceeded by straight 
condemnation, "[a] reduction or increase in the value of proper- 
201. Lucas, 112 s. Ct. at 2900. 
202. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943). 
203. See id. 
204. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 320 (1987). 
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ty . . . by reason of legislation for or the beginning or comple- 
tion of a project . . . are incidents of ownership. [Such increases 
and decreases] cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the consti- 
tutional sense."205 The court fured the time of "taking" as the 
time of payment of the award, when government has not sub- 
stantially interfered with landowners' rights in their property 
prior to 
That ruling was affirmed in 1984 when the Supreme Court 
held that a taking takes place on the date of deposit of the 
award, provided that  the landowner failed to show any consti- 
tutionally significant impairment of its interests that amounted 
to an  earlier taking, since that deposit constituted acquiescence 
by the condemnor.207 In First English, the Court in dicta com- 
mented that even though, as a matter of law, an  illegitimate 
taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay, 
interference that rises to the level of a taking might begin 
much earlier, and compensation could be measured from that 
earlier time.208 Thus, it appears to be critical to differentiate 
between acceptable preliminary activity and unacceptable sub- 
stantial interference or constitutionally significant impairment 
of the landowner's interest. 
In 1985, the Fifth Circuit ruled that where the condemnor 
had not deposited security with the court (thereby defining the 
scope of the project and constructively taking the property), the 
relevant date of taking for purposes of valuing the compensa- 
tion was the date of trial.209 However, since the facts indicat- 
ed that  the condemning authority (here a telephone utility 
company) had signXcantly impaired landowner Hazel Gully's 
property rights prior to the time of trial, the court held that 
she should be compensated for that impairment as well. The 
company's delays in pursuing the condemnation action were 
held to be compensable. In a telling statement, the Gully court 
wrote that "[tlime is money, and the jury believed that the time 
Gully spent waiting for Bell to do something cost her 
$92,000."~~~ 
205. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres, 696 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1983), ard,  
467 U.S. 1 (1984) (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)). 
206. Id. at 356. 
207. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 US.  1, 14-15 (1984). 
208. First English, 482 US. at 320. 
209. Gully v.. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 774 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
210. Id. at 1292. 
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The Fifth Circuit has noted that rules and standards to be 
applied in measuring just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment are not absolute and invariable.211 If the scope of 
the project ("SOP") is enlarged, additional property need not be 
shown to  have been specified as involved in the project at the 
outset for the scope of the project to apply, so long as the need 
for additional property became known during the course of 
planning or original construction.212 Here again, a strong 
premise exists to look at the date of the earliest municipal 
conduct where predatory actions are involved. Making the 
determination of timing even more equity-oriented, the court 
held that the crucial inquiry is whether serious anticipation of 
the condemnation diminished any potential purchaser's reason- 
able expectations as to its uses.213 This part of the holding is, 
at its core, the very essence of the Supreme Court's concept of 
R.I.B.E. 
The trial judge has primary responsibility to determine 
these SOP issues.214 The Fifth Circuit stated that the SOP 
rule operates like a presumption, disregarding both positive or 
negative effects on compensation that are attributable t o  the 
project itself. "The key to a just determination of the SOP issue 
is to set the date as of which the rule is triggered with due 
regard for the compensation consequences, so that the pre- 
sumption does not unfairly favor either the Government or the 
landowner."215 
In the context of most predatory zoning by state and local 
governments, government's conduct is intended t o  depress the 
targeted property's value. While value-enhancement issues, 
such as possible zoning changes which would allow more profit- 
able use of the property, are subject to the limitations noted 
earlier, state-caused diminutions properly should be ignored in 
determining compensation. For instance, the Texas Supreme 
Court has conditioned the determination of compensation for 
property taken by eminent domain by stating that "fair market 
value must, by definition, be computed as if there were no pro- 
ceedings to eliminate that market.77216 This language focuses 
211. United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979). 
212. Id. at 793. 
213. Id. at 807. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 806. 
216. City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis 
added). 
868 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 11993 
upon the direct condemnation proceedings themselves, but its 
essence is t o  neutralize the negative effect on market value 
created by government's activities. It follows that, in the area 
of predatory takings, the value-impacting conduct by the gov- 
ernment should be neutralized in property value calculations in 
the same way that straightforward proceedings to condemn are 
neutralized in a direct taking for purposes of determining val- 
ue. The "just compensation" mandated by the Constitution 
should not be diminished because government has chosen rent- 
seeking conduct-predatory gamesmanshiprather than a 
straightforward taking.217 
F. Future Value 
Three fbture-value doctrines overlap in shaping a property 
owner's R.I.B.E. and  must be considered together. 
1. "Remote or speculative" versus R.I.B.E. 
The rules for exclusion of "remote or speculative" evidence 
of land value should not be used to foreclose R.I.B.E. proof in 
predatory zoning cases. Normally, the proper way for the court 
to limit the effect of evidence which should not influence its 
determination of market value is by excluding it.218 Attempt- 
ing to instruct the jury as to which elements it is to consider or 
what weight thoseelements should be given is not proper 
the court.219 
for 
I f .  . . a proffered potential use is not reasonably practicable 
or probable, so that no reasonably minded trier of fact faith- 
k l ly  applying the law could find that it represents an ele- 
ment of fair market value, then of course the landowner is not 
entitled to have evidence concerning that use considered by 
the trier of fact.220 
Valuation of just compensation may depend on the timing of 
the valuation itself. "Remote, speculative, and conjectural" uses 
of the property certainly might include those which are contrary 
to existing governmental zoning or restriction. These uses may 
be prospective or existing. Existing uses may predate the 
217. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
US .  304, 320 (1987). 
218. State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). 
219. DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. 1965). 
220. United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 818 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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restrictions which seek to  limit or eliminate the pre-existing 
uses. The zoning restrictions themselves are subject to a wide 
range of possible revisions or elimination.221 They may change 
the legality of a use during the eminent domain proceedings.222 
If the timing of the valuation is based on the time of "taking," 
and if the existing use of the property at that time is 
presumptively legal, based on an existing permit allowing that 
use, then that use should be one of the factors for determining 
the compensable value of the property being taken.22s More 
importantly, if any restrictions upon the existing use are found 
to be part of the municipality's pattern of predatory regulation, 
such restrictions logically should be ignored in formulating the 
value of the taking. In such an analysis, it is not "remote or 
speculative" to allow the fair market value for compensation 
purposes to reflect an R.I.B.E. which, but for government's 
predatory behavior, would truly be a reasonable expectation. 
As to reasonable fbture uses that would be embraced within 
R.I.B.E., most of the case law regarding the admissibility of 
evidence pertaining to values of prohibited uses of the property 
relates to prospective uses. The landowner must say that the 
property should not be valued based on its existing usage, but 
rather, should be based on a more valuable prospective use 
which is currently restricted or prohibitedeZa Thus, the timing 
of the government's predatory regulation is essential to questions 
of both current and potential future market value. 
2. Highest and best use and R.I.B.E. 
Not all reasonable expectations of value are tied to  current 
land use, and a future expectation could exist only to be 
frustrated by subsequent predatory conduct of government. We 
have noted that Lucas requires that local property and tort  laws, 
as they exist on the date of acquisition by the private landowner, 
form the basis for determining R.I.B.E.2* However, it can be 
maintained that the earliest date of government's predatory 
activity should be the R.1.B.E.-determining date in a predatory 
regulatory taking. However, both views run afoul of two classical 
221. City of Austin y. C a ~ i z z o ,  267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. 1954). 
222. Id. 
223. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d at 821. 
224. See State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); NICHOLS, 
supm note 101, $8 12.02[1], 12B.12. 
225. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
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eminent domain concepts that look to future uses in exploring 
the damages suffered by the private owner: (1) the concept of 
"highest and best use," and (2) the corollary concept that 
allocates the benefit of probable future regulatory changes to the 
property owner. 
In valuing the compensation to be paid owners for property 
taken from them by the government for public use, "[tlhe 
objective of the judicial process under the Constitution and 
statutes is to make the landowner whole and to award him only 
what he could have obtained for his land in a free market."226 
This market value may be shown by the property's most 
profitable use.227 Accordingly, appropriate compensation is 
determined by the market value of the property, considering its 
highest and best use.'" The rules of evidence are necessarily 
liberal regarding such proof of market value.229 To be 
consistent with the value-laden safeguards erected in state and 
federal constitutions to protect citizens from the effects of an  
abusive exercise of the power of eminent domain by government, 
requirements for compensation should be liberally ~ons t rued . '~~  
Similarly, compliance by government with the established 
procedural requirements of condemnation should be strictly 
demanded.231 
Traditionally, the factfinder is entitled to consider every 
factor determining what could have been obtained for the 
property in a transaction between the hypothetically prudent, 
willing, and able buyer and sellerY2 All matters that tend to 
increase or diminish the present market value are properly 
admitted.25s All factors which would be given weight in 
negotiations between a buyer and seller are to be  ons side red.'^ 
Thus, the measure of just compensation for market value is not 
226. City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. 1974). 
227. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 345 (1936). 
228. McAshan v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 739 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987). 
229. Thompson v. State, 319 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
230. City of Houston v. Derby, 215 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.), error 
refused (1948). 
231. City of Fort Worth v. Dietert, 271 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). 
232. City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 246-47 (Tex. 1972); see State 
v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 360-62 (Tenn. 1991). 
233. Sample v. T e ~ e s s e e  Gas Transmission Co., 251 S.W.2d 221, 223-24 (Tex. 
1952). 
234. State v. Knapp, 740 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. Ct. App.), judgment set aside, 
742 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1987). 
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limited to the value of the property's present use, but includes 
any additional value added by realistic prospects for developing 
it to a higher and more suitable purpose.235 This concept, 
providing that market value equals the value of the investors' 
reasonable marketplace expectations as to the development 
potential of the property rights being taken, is materially similar 
to the R.I.B.E. approach pointed to by the Lucas Court to better 
identlfy property values which must be compensated if taken by 
government's regulatory actions.236 
3. Future value: Unique suitability and R.I.B.E. 
One reasonable expectation of an owner is tied to prospective 
business uses of a parcel of land. Special values attributable to 
the property's unique suitability for the conduct of a particular 
future business can be introduced as evidence establishing its 
market value.237 Examples of such special values might include 
proximity to competing businesses, availability of zoning 
variances, and differences in applicable restrictive  covenant^.^^ 
In determining future value, unique suitability is an important 
element of market value, and location has been described as the 
keystone and soul of the economics of market value of real 
property.23g In this regard, there exists a presumption in favor 
of the existing use of land.240 Again, most states value the 
damages arising out of loss of unique suitability based on the 
willing buyer-seller equation.241 
The factors involved in "future-looking" value determinations 
are not unlimited, even if they are aspects of a willing buyer- 
seller formulation. For instance, the Texas Supreme Court has 
observed that "purely speculative uses" which are wholly 
unavailable to the property's buyer or seller would not be factors 
in their decision to buy or sell and, thus, should be excluded from 
consideration of market value.242 Most importantly, in their 
235. United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979). 
236. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992). 
237. See State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (T~M.  Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. City 
of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). 
238. City of Austin v. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
239. Madison S. Rayburn, Legal Rights and Legal Fictions in Condemnation, 10 
HOUS. L. REV. 251, 259 (1972). 
240. McAshan v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 739 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987). 
241. City of Austin v. C a ~ i z z o ,  267 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tex. 1954). 
242. Id. 
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opinion in City of Austin u. Cannizzo, the Texas court used 
language bearing upon the future market value for use in the 
jury instruction: 
You are instructed that the term "market value" is the price 
which the property would bring when it is offered for sale by 
one who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one 
who is under no necessity of buying it, taking into 
consideration all of the uses to which it is reasonably adaptable 
and for which it either is or in all reasonable probability will 
become available within the reasonable 
The critical determination is whether unique suitability for 
a particular fbture business site as a potential future use is 
contemplated in the proffered evidence and reflected in the value 
placed on the property by reasonable market expectations. Lucas 
poses the following question: Would the marketplace possess 
certain R.I.B.E. characteristics as to future uses such as a unique 
suitability for a particular business that would impact the 
current value? If not, then "[elvidence should be excluded [when 
it relates] to remote, speculative, and conjectural uses, as well as 
injuries, which are not reflected in the present market value of 
the property."244 
The courts play a particularly difficult role in determining 
whether fbture value is applicable. It is the role of the court to 
determine what evidence is to be presented to the finder of fact 
in its determination of market value.245 The trial judge is 
vested with considerable discretion in determining the 
admissibility of evidence as to market value, and the reviewing 
court is "not authorized to substitute [its] rulings for [the trial 
court's] exclusion of evidence unless it appears that [it] has 
abused [its] discretion."246 
G. State Deterrence and R. I. B.E. Calculations 
Personal freedoms are protected from predatory state 
conduct through a variety of mechanisms, most of which center 
around denying the state any significant rewards of conduct 
inimical to the Bill of Rights. By giving the state a disincentive 
to  engage in certain conduct, that conduct, it is hoped, will be 
243. Id. at 815. 
244. State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). 
245. DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. 1965). 
246. Jacobs v. State, 384 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
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discouraged. For instance, the exclusionary rule hangs like the 
proverbial Sword of Damocles over constitutionally impermissible 
federal actions involving coerced confessions or wrongNly seized 
evidence.247 In 1961 this rule was applied to actions by the 
separate states securing individual liberties against state 
encroachment.248 Creating disincentives for predatory state 
conduct would be equally persuasive in Takings Clause 
jurisprudence. 
A basic premise of the drafters of the Constitution, revisited 
in the Lucas opinion, is that constitutional safeguards of 
individual property rights, as well as personal freedoms such as 
speechug and religion:50 deserve the highest dignity and 
protection.251 Under Lucas it would appear constitutionally 
impermissible for the state to benefit from its predatory conduct 
and escape from paying for value added by the condemnation 
project. Moreover, it seems offensive to the Takings Clause to 
reward the state with the fiscal advantage of an award based on 
the diminished marketability of the project after the 
condemnation has become a de facto certainty. The R.I.B.E. of 
property owners are certainly affected by the state's action, and 
just compensation is required. In order to  provide protections of 
equal dignity between property rights under the Fifth 
Amendment and those guaranteed for other constitutional rights 
and &eedoms, the most appropriate moment in time to determine 
value is whatever moment would do the most to discourage 
predatory state conduct. 
The R.I.B.E. calculus is perhaps the ultimate issue in most 
Takings Clause contests in the wake of five years of significant 
Supreme Court revision. This calculus requires unique 
consideration of each of the clusters of Takings Clause doctrines. 
In the instance of predatory municipal zoning practices, the 
approach requires that R.I.B.E. determinations address (i) the 
timing of the regulatory "taking" as distinct from the timing of 
the owner's capital investment; (ii) the body of law that must be 
brought to bear upon the R.I.B.E. formulation; (iii) the 
247. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
248. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961). 
249. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904. 
250. Id. at 2907. 
251. Id. at 2901. 
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percentages of value of the fee simple of the entire tract as 
contrasted to  that of the portions of the tract or the single 
strands of rights within the entire fee simple bundle; and (iv) the 
traditional concept of "highest and best use," which accounts for 
future value, and how the highest and best use should be 
ascertained in light of the R.I.B.E. timing issues. 
The Supreme Court has come a great distance in just a few 
years t o  bring greater order out of Takings Clause chaos. It now 
remains for government and private counsel to persuade courts 
to  resolve the open R.I.B.E. issues of timing and the applicable 
body of law. 
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Michigan has generated a number of interesting lawsuits involving 
predatory municipal and regulation practices. Chief among them is 
Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1101 (1984), where the city drove private code enforcement in 
order to require private owners to install unnecessary equipment and 
encouraged stripping of vacant neighborhood homes, all in an effort to 
obtain the properties a t  artificially low market values. See also 
Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 
1970); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), d#, 
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Board of Educ. v. Clarke, 280 N.W.2d 574 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
California has been a particularly fertile source of litigation 
involving temporary regulatory takings of a predatory nature. Many 
landowners have been successhl in their lawsuits against 
municipalities. See, eg., Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 
F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); Richmond Elks 
Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 
1977); City of Torrance v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1976); 
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1972); City of Los 
Angeles v. Tilem, 191 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Ct. App. 1983); Taper v. City of 
Long Beach, 181 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Ct. App. 1982); People ex rel. Dep't of 
Pub. Works v. Peninsula Enters., Inc., 153 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
See also Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 
(1st Cir. 1983) (property owner brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action 
where government "fioze" development of land without actually 
condemning i t  so as to reduce its market value and thereby reduce 
compensation required upon eventual taking); Board of Comm'rs v. 
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d 74, 86 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958) ('The conclusions. . . are further supported by the many 
decisions which condemn the arbitrary adoption of a zoning ordinance 
for the sole purpose of depressing land values preliminary to eminent 
domain proceedings."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1985). 
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